The aforesaid problems have solutions and these solutions lie in the idea of moderation. If for instance, the intellectual does not want to become a fanatic, he must moderate his zeal for truth, and the same holds for the other personalities.
This solution however seems to shed light on morality itself and what it means to be "moderate". Moderation is not just the mean between two extremes but it is primarily the degree that one holds a personality trait, such that following it doesn't lead one to betray that personality. And here it is important to say that "betray" means "logically contradict"; for all morality is reasonable, so if an action is unreasonable, then neither can it be moral.
It may be advanced as a theorem of praexology that no one wants to betray their personality. I suppose that this may be proved by the fact that the personality is often confounded with that which the person values most; a sexual man is called sensual, and such. However, it often happens that a personality can be betrayed, so that "no one wants to betray their personality" is not a mere tautology. Usually, it appears that some value, which is necessary for other values, has all or the lion's share of the personality imputed to it since it is a means that is useful for attaining the end or "that which the person values most". In this instance, it is the this former value which receives the name of "personality" and gives it its name; the love of freedom makes a man value power and therefore is he named "a freedom lover", or a man who lets the love of logic lead him to a certain philosophy is more a lover of logic than a lover of philosophy. The rule that "no one wants to betray their own personality" is especially applicable to this construction of "personality".And praxeologically, this construction is the most convenient since it is stated in terms of the means-ends framework of the science of action.
So I believe that it is as evident that people don't want to betray their personalities as it is to say that people don't want to to have the cost of their means increased; no one wants the value of their tractors or capital inflated if they want to make use of them -the market abhors a spread between the future and present value of a good and it abhors it even more when this spread is increased. Similarly so when the personality is betrayed. Therefore, the same law that makes a necessary rise in interest rates painful and an unnecessary rise in the same unbearable, also guarantees that a personality trait that leads to its own betrayal and downfall is no trait worth keeping (ceteris paribus).
And this leads to the final implication, that moderating a personality means to find a trait that most easily serves your highest values.
Friday, January 6, 2012
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
Other Problems Considered
To continue my previous theme, the next several problems I want to investigate are called the problems of the investigator, the intellectual, and the loyal man.
The investigator is a person who enjoys trying to solve puzzles. Assume that he wants to gather as much information as possible about a certain puzzle. But due to some external factors, he never collects enough information. Assuming that he must make a decision the investigator must then due the exact opposite of what a careful researcher should, and draw conclusions from his insufficient evidence. So we see that the researcher must become a loud-mouth. But one could object that this is per accident and not per se. But even per se the investigator can become a loud-mouth. For instance, after a review of the Cuban health statistics, such a person could become an outspoken opponent of capitalistic health service. The investigative personality easily transforms from the realm of unbiased observation to the realm of polemical action.
The intellectual is simply someone who prides himself on living and acting in accord with what he thinks is correct. But the intellectual may easily discover theorems and conclusions that go beyond the understandings of his fellows. If that happens, then the intellectual who acts in accord with these conclusions must act in an unusual way; he will be a radical to his friends and a monster to his enemies. As such, then, the radical intellectual is seen as a strange fanatic and his fanaticism may do damage to himself and others. As such then, the quest for truth per se, the calm and level-headed analysis and synthesis of propositions, can lead to wide-eyed fanaticism.
The loyal man, must be considered as a man who does anything for his friends. Yet this loyal man, can become the biggest backstabber. For instance, in politics, if a man loves his friends then he can very well act against the interests of his other constituents or aquaintances that he meets in the other party. If he will do anything for his friends, then he can certainly go so far as to use the confidence entrusted to him by anyone less than his friends, to gain political office and as soon as he gains that office so soon will he retract the lukewarm promises that he had made. So out of loyalty a man can appear to be conniving and false in his relations with others.
The great riddle continues, if you don't want to have a bad reputation then you must cultivate a lack of loyalty, and if you want to avoid rash judgment then you must forget cool-headed inquiry. How do we solve the problem? I'll leave that for another post though I already have a hypothesis.
The investigator is a person who enjoys trying to solve puzzles. Assume that he wants to gather as much information as possible about a certain puzzle. But due to some external factors, he never collects enough information. Assuming that he must make a decision the investigator must then due the exact opposite of what a careful researcher should, and draw conclusions from his insufficient evidence. So we see that the researcher must become a loud-mouth. But one could object that this is per accident and not per se. But even per se the investigator can become a loud-mouth. For instance, after a review of the Cuban health statistics, such a person could become an outspoken opponent of capitalistic health service. The investigative personality easily transforms from the realm of unbiased observation to the realm of polemical action.
The intellectual is simply someone who prides himself on living and acting in accord with what he thinks is correct. But the intellectual may easily discover theorems and conclusions that go beyond the understandings of his fellows. If that happens, then the intellectual who acts in accord with these conclusions must act in an unusual way; he will be a radical to his friends and a monster to his enemies. As such, then, the radical intellectual is seen as a strange fanatic and his fanaticism may do damage to himself and others. As such then, the quest for truth per se, the calm and level-headed analysis and synthesis of propositions, can lead to wide-eyed fanaticism.
The loyal man, must be considered as a man who does anything for his friends. Yet this loyal man, can become the biggest backstabber. For instance, in politics, if a man loves his friends then he can very well act against the interests of his other constituents or aquaintances that he meets in the other party. If he will do anything for his friends, then he can certainly go so far as to use the confidence entrusted to him by anyone less than his friends, to gain political office and as soon as he gains that office so soon will he retract the lukewarm promises that he had made. So out of loyalty a man can appear to be conniving and false in his relations with others.
The great riddle continues, if you don't want to have a bad reputation then you must cultivate a lack of loyalty, and if you want to avoid rash judgment then you must forget cool-headed inquiry. How do we solve the problem? I'll leave that for another post though I already have a hypothesis.
Monday, December 26, 2011
The Problem of the Bureaucrat
This essay is not about what is normally and frequently called the bureaucrat; a paper-pushing, buck-passer, but rather about a certain personality type. I call this personality bureaucratic because it's essence consists in the desire to please others and follow their orders.
Now everyone would desire to have someone to be their retainer, follower, order-taker, etc.For the order-taker, Libido Domiandi fires their breasts unto service and Vindicius is their muse. I suppose such a character is not so curious when you realize that it can be easily inculcated in anyone who is consistently concerned about the fate of their fellows. The busy-body is essentially the teacher's pet, the obedient son, the mothering girl, etc. This personality trait however, in accord with our theme of analyzing intersubjective ironies, can be extremely counterproductive.
One would think that the servant and benefactor of a man would be his perfect instrument and vice versa however this is frequently not so. Imagine this, a boy/girl is told to always behave and observe proper respect for authority. However, sooner or later, that authority tries to carry out a command like "go get a wooden plank". However, since the bureaucrat follows orders to the letter, he doesn't know whether to get a wooden plank quickly or slowly or at medium speed. So he/she leisurely searches it out much to the chagrin of the commander, who has an immediate need for it. The bureaucratic person, responding to his concern for people and to other's love for servants, tries to be as nice as possible and ends up being as injurious as possible. The saying "respect your elders" soon becomes "if you want something done well, then do it yourself".
The disturbing implication of this is that, if you wanted something done correctly, then the virtue of obedience must be seemingly exorcised or at least your concern for people must be eliminated. Was your selflessness vicious or was your virtue impractical? These are the two equally probable and haunting demons which ,alternately, taking his turn scourging our bureaucrat's poor soul.
Are there people who exhibit the bureaucratic personality most, and what does this imply, if anything, for society? These questions will be answered later.
Now everyone would desire to have someone to be their retainer, follower, order-taker, etc.For the order-taker, Libido Domiandi fires their breasts unto service and Vindicius is their muse. I suppose such a character is not so curious when you realize that it can be easily inculcated in anyone who is consistently concerned about the fate of their fellows. The busy-body is essentially the teacher's pet, the obedient son, the mothering girl, etc. This personality trait however, in accord with our theme of analyzing intersubjective ironies, can be extremely counterproductive.
One would think that the servant and benefactor of a man would be his perfect instrument and vice versa however this is frequently not so. Imagine this, a boy/girl is told to always behave and observe proper respect for authority. However, sooner or later, that authority tries to carry out a command like "go get a wooden plank". However, since the bureaucrat follows orders to the letter, he doesn't know whether to get a wooden plank quickly or slowly or at medium speed. So he/she leisurely searches it out much to the chagrin of the commander, who has an immediate need for it. The bureaucratic person, responding to his concern for people and to other's love for servants, tries to be as nice as possible and ends up being as injurious as possible. The saying "respect your elders" soon becomes "if you want something done well, then do it yourself".
The disturbing implication of this is that, if you wanted something done correctly, then the virtue of obedience must be seemingly exorcised or at least your concern for people must be eliminated. Was your selflessness vicious or was your virtue impractical? These are the two equally probable and haunting demons which ,alternately, taking his turn scourging our bureaucrat's poor soul.
Are there people who exhibit the bureaucratic personality most, and what does this imply, if anything, for society? These questions will be answered later.
Sunday, December 25, 2011
The Tragi-Comedy of Human Life
This marks the beginning of a series of posts about the way intersubjectivity can affect our relationships, ideas, and world.
For instance, take our love lives; if a person says that he/she will love anyone, then it is possible for that person to be approached by an unattractive person. If that person is rejected, and since experience is necessary for finding relationships, then that rejected person would become even less likeable in the future.
This is similar in the realm of politics; if one person criticizes another then that other (out of self-love) tries to become more and more unlike the critic and so, even more unlikeable by the other person.
Likewise, a group of loners (those who enjoy being alone) are enjoy their loneliness even more with other loners who can appreciate the same thing. So it was by the love of loneliness that friendship blossomed.
The kingdom of fortune and chance is a very rich one, and deserves greater philosophical inspection later.
For instance, take our love lives; if a person says that he/she will love anyone, then it is possible for that person to be approached by an unattractive person. If that person is rejected, and since experience is necessary for finding relationships, then that rejected person would become even less likeable in the future.
This is similar in the realm of politics; if one person criticizes another then that other (out of self-love) tries to become more and more unlike the critic and so, even more unlikeable by the other person.
Likewise, a group of loners (those who enjoy being alone) are enjoy their loneliness even more with other loners who can appreciate the same thing. So it was by the love of loneliness that friendship blossomed.
The kingdom of fortune and chance is a very rich one, and deserves greater philosophical inspection later.
Friday, December 23, 2011
The Logic of Mathematics
Mathematics, has never seemed too logical to me and this is due to (1) pedagogy, and (2) the use of the "equals" sign.
Now for pedagogy, most math teachers or at least their students, seem to conceive that math is about real objects -marbles, pyramids, train tracks, etc. and that math is about countable things. However most mathematicians and aristotle would state that math is just symbols made up by the mind and arranged logically with only an incidental application to reality. This response obviates some of the obstacles to learning math that the "realist" view builds up; for instance, that negative or imaginary numbers don't exist and yet math deals with them. Additionally it also makes the theory of equations much more sensible since equations are not like see-saws where, by the operation of weight, each side of the saw tends to balance w/the other side but are rather logical relations of equality such that if one side changes, then the other side must, logically, change. A non-realist view also has the advantage of circumventing the biggest problem in realist math: simultaneous determination; for in mathematics the parts of an equation do not cause the other parts of the equation or expression. 1+1 does not cause 2 in the sense that a man throwing a ball causes it to fly, for math is not physics. So mathematical objects have at best, only a mental causal relationship, and the inputs and outputs of expressions are always stationary since every way one manipulates an expression makes it either equal to itself or it completely changes the definition of the expression so that no matter the expression or the changes done to it, that expression is always itself. This law of identity is always and everywhere the same as the law of simultaneous determination.
The second reason is that when one solves an equation one uses the fact that it is equal to something in order to prove that it is equal to some other thing. However, because of the use of the equal sign, everything is explicitly stated to be equal prior to the proof that everything is. And so, to solve an equation is basically the same thing as to reason circularly. But circular reasoning is illogical so that raises a question, "is it possible to base mathematical proof (equation solving) on a logical foundation?" The answer to this is yes for several reasons but let me just sketch out my preliminary conclusions first.
1,2,3, etc. are defined like this: 1=--1, 2=--2,3=--3 or each number is the complement of its complement.
3-1 is just the difference b/t the complement of 3’s complement and the complement of 1’s complement. And this is just the complement of the set “3&1” in the set of 3 things. And this is 2.
Clearly I intend to use set algebra to deduce normal algebra. But set algebra is basically logic, so normal algebra will be established logically.
Wednesday, August 24, 2011
A quick post on my feelings RE: Austrian Economics
Intro: though some said that Austrian Economics is a defense of economic liberalism -that is,a defense of immoral economics -I say contrarily.The below is my reply in the debate:
"AE (Austrian Economics) is just a science of action qua action. My remarks will have to be short and my tardy appearance in this debate will make them shorter still, so forgive me for the cryptic-ness.
Essentially, AE uses ethical-sounding terms, just as the chemist does. For the latter, “ideal gas” doesn’t mean “a supreme standard of human life that is gaseous in form” but it means “a powerful gas qua gas”. So “fair price” in AE means “a stable price qua price”. AE also defends liberalism but this is more historical accident than anything else. If an austrian economist ever said that free-trade was good, he either meant that free-trade was a stable condition qua trade, or he meant that free-trade was the best way to get wealth (all things equal), assuming people want wealth (even though it may conflict with justice). In no way does AE preach capitalism as a matter of necessity -as a matter of necessity it preaches nothing but analyzes everything.
So I think there are definitely some things to be learned from Mises/Rothbard -just as there were important things to be learned from Aristotle even though Plato was long-preferred to the former."
"AE (Austrian Economics) is just a science of action qua action. My remarks will have to be short and my tardy appearance in this debate will make them shorter still, so forgive me for the cryptic-ness.
Essentially, AE uses ethical-sounding terms, just as the chemist does. For the latter, “ideal gas” doesn’t mean “a supreme standard of human life that is gaseous in form” but it means “a powerful gas qua gas”. So “fair price” in AE means “a stable price qua price”. AE also defends liberalism but this is more historical accident than anything else. If an austrian economist ever said that free-trade was good, he either meant that free-trade was a stable condition qua trade, or he meant that free-trade was the best way to get wealth (all things equal), assuming people want wealth (even though it may conflict with justice). In no way does AE preach capitalism as a matter of necessity -as a matter of necessity it preaches nothing but analyzes everything.
So I think there are definitely some things to be learned from Mises/Rothbard -just as there were important things to be learned from Aristotle even though Plato was long-preferred to the former."
Saturday, August 13, 2011
Philosophical Bloviations: Of the Relation Between Faith and Reason Pt. 1
Yes, it has been a while since I posted on this blog but there has not been a like absence of philosophizing on my part. Today I want to write about the relation between faith (supernatural theology) and reason (natural theology) from the point of view of St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica.
Now let me establish some necessary premises about Philosophy (science) and its relations with reason and about Supernatural Theology, before I analyze them later. First, all men shouldn't know what is above the knowable ("what is above reason"). To be unknowable is to be irrational -not approachable by ratiocination. Now nothing irrational is in philosophy. Further, nothing is known but what is true, that is, if something is known then it is true for other wise it would be possible for some known thing to be outside the set of true things, which contradicts the idea that nothing is known accept what is true. And again, knowledge is only concerned with being so that if it is knowledge then it is about being (and being=truth). That being equals truth may be seen later when Aquinas writes that all that is, is true. However all that is, is treated of in philosophy. Now because all knowledge is justified, and all justification is ratiocination, then clearly all knowledge is rational. Here is where the difficulty ensues, for if all knowledge is contained in philosophy (and by modus ponens, all philosophy is rational), then it looks as if philosophy will suffice for, and supernatural theology is useless for, all human needs. And yet, any Catholic believes that supernatural theology is of utmost importance. How does one solve this problem?
Sacred Science (or S.S. or supernatural theology) is the study of things above reason and accepted on faith. Sacred Science is science because sacred science proceeds by means of faith, and all sciences are differentiated according to the means by which the science's conclusions are made.
So S.S. is not rational and is based on faith. Now faith= -(ratiocination) and yet S.S. is also true. So clearly, by a fourth figure syllogism, some irrational things are true. Problem number two now ensues: If philosophy contains nothing irrational, then it must contain something rational by disjunct subtraction. So it is possible at least, that philosophy contains all knowables. But as plato observed, knowledge is true, so nothing known is false. So if philosophy has all knowledge and if all knowledge is true, then philosophy would contain all truth. But again, some truth is irrational, so some philosophy would be irrational which contradicts the fact that philosophy is only rational. So clearly philosophy doesn't contain all knowledge but if that is true, then that would contradict the idea that everything that is, is treated of in philosophy. Deep are the depths that one must plumb, to resolve a weak mind's contradictions. But I realize that this post is lengthy so I'm going to put the left-overs of tonight's mental meal in the fridge and return to the subject tomorrow.
Now let me establish some necessary premises about Philosophy (science) and its relations with reason and about Supernatural Theology, before I analyze them later. First, all men shouldn't know what is above the knowable ("what is above reason"). To be unknowable is to be irrational -not approachable by ratiocination. Now nothing irrational is in philosophy. Further, nothing is known but what is true, that is, if something is known then it is true for other wise it would be possible for some known thing to be outside the set of true things, which contradicts the idea that nothing is known accept what is true. And again, knowledge is only concerned with being so that if it is knowledge then it is about being (and being=truth). That being equals truth may be seen later when Aquinas writes that all that is, is true. However all that is, is treated of in philosophy. Now because all knowledge is justified, and all justification is ratiocination, then clearly all knowledge is rational. Here is where the difficulty ensues, for if all knowledge is contained in philosophy (and by modus ponens, all philosophy is rational), then it looks as if philosophy will suffice for, and supernatural theology is useless for, all human needs. And yet, any Catholic believes that supernatural theology is of utmost importance. How does one solve this problem?
Sacred Science (or S.S. or supernatural theology) is the study of things above reason and accepted on faith. Sacred Science is science because sacred science proceeds by means of faith, and all sciences are differentiated according to the means by which the science's conclusions are made.
So S.S. is not rational and is based on faith. Now faith= -(ratiocination) and yet S.S. is also true. So clearly, by a fourth figure syllogism, some irrational things are true. Problem number two now ensues: If philosophy contains nothing irrational, then it must contain something rational by disjunct subtraction. So it is possible at least, that philosophy contains all knowables. But as plato observed, knowledge is true, so nothing known is false. So if philosophy has all knowledge and if all knowledge is true, then philosophy would contain all truth. But again, some truth is irrational, so some philosophy would be irrational which contradicts the fact that philosophy is only rational. So clearly philosophy doesn't contain all knowledge but if that is true, then that would contradict the idea that everything that is, is treated of in philosophy. Deep are the depths that one must plumb, to resolve a weak mind's contradictions. But I realize that this post is lengthy so I'm going to put the left-overs of tonight's mental meal in the fridge and return to the subject tomorrow.
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